

7 | Middle East and North Africa

Palestine (Gaza Strip) remained the region's most severe food crisis, with 1.1 million people or 50 percent of its population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Recovery will require the end of hostilities and major investment, and is expected to take decades.

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Yemen and Syrian Arab Republic remained the region's largest food crises in terms of magnitude, driven by prolonged economic challenges and the lasting impacts of conflict.

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The political transition in Syrian Arab Republic offers hope for the return of displaced populations after 13 years of conflict, but localized conflict in 2024 still led to further displacement.

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The two countries/territories with nutrition crises in the region – Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Yemen (Government of Yemen-controlled areas) – were among the four most severe nutrition crises globally due to the impacts of conflict. Algeria (Sahrawi refugees), Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic were countries of nutrition concern.

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The outlook for 2025 depends on the re-establishment of ceasefires in Lebanon and Palestine (Gaza Strip), and increased stability in Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

Middle East and North Africa

Lebanon | Libya | Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) | Syrian Arab Republic | Yemen | Refugee populations in Algeria, Armenia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Jordan

Continued conflict and growing economic crises, characterized by high poverty and inflation, have driven high levels of acute food insecurity across four countries/territories and four refugee population groups. An end to intense conflict in Palestine and Lebanon, coupled with increased stability in Syrian Arab Republic, is vital for improvement and recovery in 2025 and beyond.

31.5M



people or 44% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in eight countries/territories with data meeting GRFC technical requirements.

23.9M




forcibly displaced people in eight countries/territories with food crises in 2024 – consisting of 15.1 million IDPs and 8.8 million refugees and asylum-seekers.

2.5M




acutely malnourished children in Yemen and Palestine (Gaza Strip). Of them, at least 0.6 million suffered the most severe form of acute malnutrition.

MAP 7.1 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in eight countries/territories, 2024 peak




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Source: IPC Global Initiative, IPC TWGs, FSC, HRP/HNO, WFP (CARI).

FIG 7.1 Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak




Share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3+ or equivalent
Analysed population
Population not analysed

The total population was analysed in all countries/territories with data.

For Yemen, the 2024 peak figure results from the aggregation of the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in areas controlled by the Government of Yemen (GoY) between October 2024 and March 2025 from the IPC, and the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance from the analysis conducted by the Food Security Cluster in areas controlled by the De Facto Authorities (DFA) covering October 2024 to February 2025.

Eleven countries/territories in this region were selected. However, for three countries/population groups – Armenia (refugees), Islamic Republic of Iran (refugees) and Libya – data did not meet GRFC technical requirements. For more information on these additional countries of concern, see page 161.

FIG. 7.2 Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak



Source: IPC Global Initiative, IPC TWGs, FSC, HNRP, WFP (CARI methodology).

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2023?

In 2024, 31.5 million people or 44 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity; however, few countries/territories had data that were comparable with 2023, when 36.7 million people (54 percent of the analysed population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Out of the eight countries/territories, including four refugee population groups, only **Palestine** (Gaza Strip and West Bank), **Lebanon** and **Jordan** (Syrian refugees) had comparable analyses for 2024 and 2023.

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), while the overall number and share of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) remained unchanged since the 2023 peak, at 2.2 million or 100 percent of the total population, the severity worsened alarmingly with the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) nearly doubling from 0.6 million to 1.1 million by April 2024 (IPC, March 2024).

In **Palestine** (West Bank), the situation deteriorated with escalating conflict and increasing economic restrictions driving 0.7 million people or 21 percent of the total population to face high levels of acute food insecurity, up from 0.6 million or 18 percent in 2023 (OCHA, December 2024).

At 1.7 million from December 2024 to March 2025, the projected number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in **Lebanon** was lower than the 2023 peak (2.3 million in January–April) when the country faced severe economic challenges. However, the situation on the ground might have been worse than projected due to the escalation of conflict in late 2024. The impact of conflict and mass displacement on key sectors of the Lebanese economy, such as trade and tourism, deepened the ongoing economic crisis (IPC, January 2025).

In **Syrian Arab Republic**, the situation remained critical, with 9.2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, driven by the continued economic crisis. The analysis pre-dated the regime change in December 2024 and the escalation of localized hostilities. Changes in methodology

prevent comparison with 2023 (OCHA, January 2025).

Yemen continued to have the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the region at 16.7 million people across both GoY and DFA-controlled areas. Despite a reduction in hostilities, the economic crisis has hindered households' recovery (IPC, October 2024; FSC, August 2024).

Displaced people across the region continued to face very difficult conditions in their host countries/territories, due to region-wide limited economic growth, significant fiscal constraints and limited livelihood opportunities. Continued economic shocks drove an increase in the Syrian refugee population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in **Jordan** – up from 62 percent of them in 2023 to 75 percent in 2024. Additionally, 64 percent of Sahrawi refugees in **Algeria** and 60 percent of Syrian refugees in **Egypt** faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 (WFP, 2023; WFP, January 2024).

Severity of acute food insecurity

Lebanon, Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Yemen (GoY-controlled areas) were the only countries/territories/areas that had IPC analyses with data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.

Data for displaced populations in **Algeria, Egypt, Iraq** and **Jordan**, along with **Syrian Arab Republic**, were derived from the WFP CARI methodology and therefore no breakdown by IPC phase of acute food insecurity was available.

1.1 million people or 50 percent of the total population are projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Palestine (Gaza Strip) from March to April 2024 (IPC, March 2024).

As high-intensity conflict caused the collapse of food systems and severely restricted economic activity and humanitarian access, the number of people in this phase almost doubled from 0.6 million, or 26 percent of the population, in December 2023–February 2024 (FRC, November 2024; IPC, March 2024). Subsequent analyses published in June and October showed improvements due to increased deliveries of commodities and the scale-up of the humanitarian response. By the end of 2024, 0.3 million or 16 percent of the population were estimated to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, October 2024).

2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across Palestine (Gaza Strip), Lebanon and Yemen (GoY-controlled areas).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), 0.9 million people or 38 percent of the total population were in IPC Phase 4. This marked a decrease since 2023, but coincided with a sharp increase in the total population facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, March 2024).

In **Lebanon**, 0.2 million people or 4 percent of the analysed population were in IPC Phase 4. Of them, 0.1 million were Syrian refugees. This represented a decrease since the 2023 peak when 0.4 million

faced IPC Phase 4, despite increasing severity in conflict-affected areas (IPC, January 2025).

In GoY-controlled areas of **Yemen**, 12 percent of the analysed population were in IPC Phase 4 from June to September 2024, before slightly decreasing to 11 percent (1.1 million people) from October 2024 to March 2025 (IPC, October 2024).

 **5.3 million people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) across Palestine (Gaza Strip), Lebanon and Yemen (GoY-controlled areas).**

This consisted of 3.5 million people in **Yemen** (GoY-controlled areas), 1.5 million in **Lebanon** and 0.3 million in **Palestine** (Gaza Strip). Lebanon experienced the largest change, with a decrease of 0.5 million since the 2023 peak, attributed to improved economic conditions, particularly in areas less impacted by conflict. In Palestine (Gaza Strip), the population in this phase decreased since 2023, coinciding with an increase in the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

 **5.5 million people in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) across Lebanon and Yemen (GoY-controlled areas).**

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), no one was in IPC Phase 2 during the peak period from March to April 2024, as continued conflict throughout 2024 drove the entire population to face IPC Phase 3 or above. By the end of 2024, the share of the population in IPC Phase 2 increased to 9 percent (0.2 million people), shifting from higher phases due to increased deliveries of commodities and the scale-up of the humanitarian response

In **Lebanon**, the share of the population in IPC Phase 2 increased marginally from 40 percent (2.1 million people) in 2023 to 42 percent (2.4 million people) in 2024, coinciding with a decrease in the population facing IPC Phase 3. In **Yemen**, 3.1 million people or 30 percent of the analysed population were in IPC Phase 2 in GoY-controlled areas. These populations remain vulnerable to shocks and require support to mitigate risks related to disasters and to protect their livelihoods.

Drivers of food crises in the region, 2024



Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in six countries/territories where 5.7 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This included four refugee population groups.

Conflict was the primary driver of the food crises in **Lebanon** and **Palestine**. Conflict in their country of origin was the primary driver for refugee populations in **Algeria**, **Egypt**, **Iraq** and **Jordan**, where they faced limited livelihood opportunities and a high reliance on humanitarian assistance, exacerbating their vulnerabilities. It remained a secondary driver in **Syrian Arab Republic** and across all of **Yemen**. See *Focus | The impact of protracted conflict in the region*, page 153.




Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity across all of Yemen, and Syrian Arab Republic, where 25.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

In **Yemen**, the economic crisis deepened as tensions between the DFA and GoY disrupted trade and financial flows (FEWS NET, October 2024). In GoY-controlled areas, the continued blockade of crude oil exports resulted in decreased customs revenues and a 30 percent decrease in fiscal reserves. This led to a shrinking of essential services and economic opportunities, further limiting household food access (IPC, October 2024).

In **Syrian Arab Republic**, the prolonged economic crisis, driven by over 13 years of conflict, persisted in 2024. Continued currency depreciation and high inflation, which averaged 129.7 percent in the first four months of 2024, constrained economic growth and limited household purchasing power. The regime change in December 2024 led to food price increases and disruptions to market activities, which stabilized by early January (OCHA, December 2024; WFP, January 2025).

FIG. 7.3 Highest food inflation rates, 2024 (compared with same month in 2023)



Sources: Algeria: Office National des Statistiques; Armenia: Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia; Egypt: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics; Iran: Statistical Centre of Iran; Iraq: Authority of Statistics and Geographic Information Systems; Jordan: Department of Statistics Jordan; Lebanon: Central Administration of Statistics; Libya: Bureau of Statistics and Census; Palestine: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.



Weather extremes were not a primary driver in any countries/territories but remained impactful across Yemen, Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.

In **Yemen**, during the planting of main cereal crops in May and June 2024, reduced rainfall decreased yields for sorghum, maize and millet. Heavy rainfall led to flooding in March and again in August 2024, causing significant damage to crops, livestock and infrastructure (IPC, October 2024; FAO-GIEWS, October 2024).

Poor temporal rainfall distribution along with high temperatures in **Syrian Arab Republic** contributed to reduced yields and limited recovery from the continued water crisis since 2021 (OCHA, January 2025).

In **Lebanon**, high temperatures and unfavourable rainfall in May 2024 contributed to a 30 percent reduction in cereal yields compared with the latest four-year average (FAO-WFP, November 2024).

Acute food insecurity since 2016

From 2016 to 2019, Yemen, a protracted food crisis, had the largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the GRFC and has consistently been among the ten countries with the largest populations experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

This included populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during peak periods each year from 2018 to 2022, primarily in DFA-controlled areas.

A protracted food crisis, **Syrian Arab Republic** has been included in all editions of the GRFC and has consistently ranked among the ten largest food crises in terms of the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

This is the third year **Lebanon** has been included in the GRFC, with previous analyses primarily focusing on the Syrian refugee population in the country. The ongoing economic crisis, which began in 2019, and escalated hostilities since October 2023, have been key drivers of the crisis.

Palestine (Gaza Strip and West Bank) has been included in eight out of nine editions, but there is limited comparability due to differing data sources and methodologies. This marks the second year of IPC coverage for Palestine (Gaza Strip).

Structural vulnerabilities underly persistently high levels of acute food insecurity

The region's high reliance on cereal imports heightens exposure to international price increases and currency fluctuations. **Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine and Yemen** all depend on cereal imports for over 80 percent of their consumption, while **Egypt** and **Syrian Arab Republic** had the lowest reliance at 43 and 46 percent respectively (FAO, 2024).

The region faces an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio, especially among the oil-importing countries/territories of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. The high ratio of debt may reduce private sector investment, constrain government spending,

FIG. 7.4 Selected structural vulnerability indicators by country/territory

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency ratio (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%)	HDI global ranking (1–192)	INFORM Risk (0–10)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)
ALGERIA	1.4	80.6	21.8	93	3	9.7
ARMENIA	2.8	77.6	17.2	76	3.9	28.0
EGYPT	1.8	43	6.7	105	4.6	18.7
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	1.1	53.4	N/A	78	5.4	15.1
IRAQ	2.1	57.6	19.1	128	6.4	8.4
JORDAN	1.6	98.5	17.8	99	3.7	3.2
LEBANON	0.4	87.4	21.5	109	5.5	3.5
LIBYA	1.0	100	18.0	92	4.3	9.2
PALESTINE		95.8	16.6*	111	5.9	6.2
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	4.9	45.5	16.0	157	7	15.5
YEMEN	3.0	92.8	18.4	186	8	29.3

* Refers to West Bank only.

For descriptions of these indicators see Technical notes, page 170.

Sources: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency ratio); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought conditions); UNDP (HDI Global Index); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment).

and restrict government policy space to respond effectively to economic shocks (WB, April 2024).

The ongoing economic crises in MENA countries/territories with food crises have severely constrained human development, as reflected in their low Human Development Index (HDI) values. **Yemen** ranks as the eighth lowest globally, while **Syrian Arab Republic** falls within the bottom 25 percent.

Continued climate extremes have exacerbated challenges in the region, with rising temperatures and declining precipitation levels. In 2023, MENA was the most water-stressed region globally, with 83 percent of the population exposed to extremely high water stress (Kuzma, Saccoccia & Chertock, August 2023). Water scarcity is further intensified by growing populations and increasing demand for water and food resources, with **Syrian Arab Republic** experiencing the highest population growth rate at 4.9 percent (UNDESA).

The ASAP crop index, which measures the percentage of the growing period affected by drought conditions, showed values exceeding 15 percent in all MENA countries except **Egypt**. This is particularly concerning for countries with a high percentage of employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, such as **Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen**.

Over half of the selected countries/territories – **Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen** – received ‘high’ or ‘very high’ INFORM Risk scores (INFORM, December 2024). This is a composite indicator assessing a country’s ability to respond to disasters based on hazard exposure, socioeconomic vulnerability and institutional coping capacity.

Acute food insecurity outlook 2025

The 2025 outlook depends on the reduction of hostilities across the region, including the stability of ceasefire agreements in Lebanon and Palestine (Gaza Strip).

Three countries/territories in the region had projections for 2025 – **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), **Lebanon** and **Yemen** – with 20.8 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. No projection data were available for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syrian Arab Republic.

Between mid-January and mid-March 2025, the ceasefire allowed a temporary alleviation of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in parts of **Palestine** (Gaza Strip). However, the blockade imposed in early March reversed the situation, with all humanitarian aid and commercial supplies prevented from entering the territory. Since 18 March, the escalating conflict has displaced over 430 000 people, further disrupted access to humanitarian assistance, markets, health, water and sanitation services, and caused additional damage to remaining essential infrastructure. Goods indispensable for people’s survival are either depleted or expected to run out. From May–September 2025, the entire population is projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, with 469 500 people or 22 percent of the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, May 2025).

In **Palestine** (West Bank), conditions are concerning, as increased violence and movement restrictions intensified following the Gaza Strip ceasefire in January 2025 (OHCHR, January 2025). Widespread home demolitions and increased insecurity displaced 40 000 people, primarily in the northern West Bank (UNRWA, March 2025).

In **Lebanon**, the ceasefire (which lasted from November 2024–February 2025) was expected to facilitate the return of IDPs to their home districts in formerly highly conflict-affected areas. However, extensive infrastructure destruction has disrupted livelihoods, hindering short-term recovery. As of March 2025, hostilities had

intensified once more, particularly in southern districts as well as in southern parts of Beirut. This led to new displacements, prevented IDP returns and obstructed recovery of disrupted livelihoods amid extensive infrastructure destruction (OCHA, March 2025).

In **Yemen**, the share of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to remain stable from 48 percent during the 2024 peak to 49 percent during the projection period of October 2024–May 2025 (IPC, October 2024; FSC, August 2024). Limited humanitarian food assistance and ongoing economic shocks from over a decade of conflict continue to drive acute food insecurity.

Increased conflict since October 2023 has damaged civilian infrastructure and critical port facilities in DFA-controlled areas, heightening the risk of fuel and food shortages in 2025. Additionally, severe frost waves from December 2024 to January 2025 were expected to damage off-season crops. Farming communities, with extremely limited coping options after years of conflict, are particularly vulnerable to these shocks (FEWS NET, December 2024).

No projection data were available for **Syrian Arab Republic**, but the security situation remains volatile (OCHA, January 2025). Insecurity persisted in northeastern and southern areas, damaging infrastructure and further restricting humanitarian access (OCHA, February 2025). Meaningful recovery will depend on a stable transition, characterized by an end to active hostilities between armed groups, strengthened state institutions, and sustained international donor support and investment. Under these conditions, real GDP growth could increase by 30 percent in 2025 alone (ESCWA, January 2025).

Refugee populations across the region continue to face significant challenges due to disrupted livelihoods, limited economic opportunities and decreased funding for humanitarian assistance (3RP, December 2024).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Two countries/territories were identified as facing a nutrition crisis – Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Yemen. Lebanon, Algeria (refugees) and Syrian Arab Republic were countries of nutrition concern.

Palestine (Gaza Strip) and **Yemen** were among the four most severe nutrition crises in the GRFC 2025.

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), high levels of displacement with restricted humanitarian access and the destruction of health and WASH systems created an environment in which GAM prevalence (by MUAC) rose to 30 percent in February 2024 in North Gaza in children under 2 years, an age group particularly vulnerable to acute malnutrition. From March to June, GAM prevalence (by MUAC) in children aged 6–59 months was 3–5 percent, increasing to just over 5 percent in July–August after significant displacement from Rafah to the Middle area and less humanitarian and commercial access. In the last quarter, GAM prevalence stabilized to 4.5–5 percent. Acute malnutrition in pregnant and breastfeeding women was high, at 15–20 percent (by MUAC), with children's meals prioritized over those of adults (Nutrition Cluster, February 2025). By the end of 2024, the entire Gaza Strip was classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with Rafah governorate in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) (IPC, October 2024).

In **Yemen**, the IPC AMN analysis was limited to GoY-controlled areas. Acute malnutrition surged towards the end of 2023, with Hodeidah Southern lowland and Ta'iz lowland experiencing the most severe deterioration. The prevalence of acute malnutrition in Hodeidah rose sharply to 33.9 percent by the end of 2023, up from 25.9 percent earlier in the year. By July 2024, four districts in Hodeidah Southern lowland and Ta'iz lowland were classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) (IPC, August 2024). In northern

Yemen, health centre screening data indicated acute malnutrition prevalence above 10 percent in 11 governorates, with prevalence over 15 percent in 8 of them (WHO, September 2024).

Data for **Lebanon**, **Syrian Arab Republic** and **Algeria** (Sahrawi refugees) were limited to historical records from 2022 and 2023. Acute malnutrition prevalence in one governorate in **Syrian Arab Republic** and among Sahrawi refugees in **Algeria** was at Serious levels (10 percent) in 2022 (UN, March 2024; UNHCR, 2024).

In **Lebanon**, prevalence levels remained below 5 percent, equivalent to Acceptable (IPC AMN Phase 1), with the highest GAM estimates among Syrian refugees in informal tented settlements (3.6 percent) (UNICEF, September 2024). Contextual factors indicated nutrition concerns, particularly in **Lebanon** and **Syrian Arab Republic**, with INFORM Severity and Risk indices rating the risk of humanitarian crisis as 'high' (Lebanon) or 'very high' (Syrian Arab Republic) (INFORM, 2024).

Acute malnutrition trends, 2020–2024

Yemen faced persistently high levels of acute malnutrition, with the prevalence exceeding 20 percent in GoY-controlled areas from 2020 to 2024 (IPC, August 2024). Acute malnutrition prevalence was relatively stable and low (0.8 percent by weight-for-height) in **Palestine** (Gaza Strip) prior to the increase to just over 5 percent (by MUAC) in July–August 2024 (Nutrition Cluster, February 2025). **Syrian Arab Republic** saw a steady rise in national acute malnutrition prevalence, from 1.7 percent in 2019 to 4.7 percent in 2023, with elevated levels in Lattakia governorate (OCHA-HNO 2024, March 2024).

The Sahrawi refugee population in **Algeria** has faced persistent acute malnutrition challenges, with a deteriorating trend in GAM prevalence between 2019 and 2022, from 8 percent to 11 percent (WFP, December 2024). In **Lebanon**, the national GAM prevalence has remained at Acceptable levels (1 percent) over the last five

FIG. 7.5 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition in two countries/territories, 2024





FIG. 7.6 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition, 2024



Sources: IPC Global Initiative, October 2024; HNO 2024, February 2024.

years with a high of 3.6 percent among refugee populations in 2024 (UNICEF/WHO/WB, 2023; Ministry of Public Health et al., 2024).

Main contributing factors to nutrition crises, 2024

Basic causes

Conflict was the main contributing factor to deteriorating nutrition in **Yemen**, **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), **Syrian Arab Republic** and **Lebanon**. Acute malnutrition was further aggravated by limited humanitarian access and flooding in **Yemen**, where funding cuts left many with reduced or no food assistance in 2023 and 2024 (IPC, August 2024).

Underlying and immediate causes

For the two IPC-analysed nutrition crises (**Palestine** (Gaza Strip) and GoY-controlled areas of **Yemen**), acute malnutrition was driven by multiple factors. In **Yemen**, data indicated 'very high' risk factors for acute malnutrition across the food, health, and care and services pathways, with

0.7M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in two countries/territories, 2024

FIG. 7.7 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2024



Sources: IPC Global Initiative, October 2024; HNO 2024, February 2024.

a low proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a minimum acceptable diet, high levels of disease, low health service coverage and suboptimal exclusive breastfeeding practices.

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), data indicated 'very high' risk factors for acute malnutrition in the food and health pathways. There were insufficient data for three of the four indicators representing the 'care and services' pathways. In particular, data were insufficient regarding vitamin A and measles vaccination coverage and the proportion of households with access to safe drinking water. However, the February 2024 Nutrition Vulnerability Analysis reported 81 percent of households needed access to safe drinking water and that the healthcare system had broken down, indicating that the care and services pathway was also likely to have 'very high' risk factors for acute malnutrition (GNC, February 2024).

2025 outlook

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), May 2025 projections indicated that the nutrition situation would deteriorate during the May–September period, with North Gaza, Gaza and Rafah governorates likely reaching Critical levels (IPC AMN Phase 4), while in Khan Younis and Deir Al-Balah, levels are likely to remain Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) (IPC, May 2025).

DISPLACEMENT | Over a quarter of all displaced people in countries/territories with food crises are in the MENA region.

Across the eight countries/territories with food crises, almost 24 million people were displaced either internally or as refugees and asylum-seekers, with many experiencing prolonged or repeated displacement.


In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), 1.9 million people or 90 percent of the population had been displaced at least once by the end of 2024 (UNRWA, December 2024), up from 1.7 million at the end of 2023 (UNRWA, December 2023). IDPs faced severely restricted humanitarian and food access, while repeated displacement severely eroded coping capacities and access to food, fresh water and medicine (IPC, November 2024).

Protracted displacement persisted in Yemen, with 4.6 million people remaining internally displaced by October 2024 after 11 years of conflict. Weather extremes increased displacement in 2024, while prevailing conditions prevented IDPs from returning (HNRP, 2025).

The regime change in **Syrian Arab Republic** brought some stability, with an estimated 270 000 Syrian returnees recorded between December 2024 and early February 2025 (UNHCR, January 2025). However, localized conflict persisted, displacing an additional 627 000 people internally, bringing the total number of IDPs to 7.4 million in 2024 (HNAP, 2023; UNHCR, October 2024).

The escalation of conflict displaced 900 000 people in **Lebanon** by late November 2023, while the November 2024 ceasefire enabled the return of 890 000 by February 2025 (IOM, November 2024; February 2025). However, damaged infrastructure and disruptions in formerly heavily conflict-affected areas are projected to hinder recovery efforts (IPC, January 2025).

FIG 7.8 Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries/territories with food crises, 2024



Source: IOM, 2024; UNRWA, 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, December 2024; Yemen HNRP, 2025.

Acute food insecurity among displaced populations

Limited livelihood opportunities for refugees in camps and host communities continued to drive high levels of acute food insecurity for displaced populations across the region.

For Syrian refugee populations in **Egypt, Iraq** and **Jordan**, rising costs of living and constrained livelihood opportunities increased household debt, further limiting access to food. In **Egypt**, the influx of Sudanese refugees placed additional pressure on already strained social services, while high inflation further restricted food access (UNHCR, November 2024; IMF, 2024). Approximately 60 percent of Syrian refugees in Egypt faced high levels of acute food insecurity from July to September 2024 (WFP, January 2024).

In **Jordan**, high living costs contributed to 75 percent of the Syrian refugee population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, July 2024; UNHCR, June 2024).

In **Lebanon**, the escalation of conflict further eroded refugees' purchasing power, with 39 percent of Syrian refugees and 40 percent of Palestinian refugees facing high levels of acute food insecurity between December 2024 and March 2025 (IPC, January 2025).


The 300 000 Syrian refugees in **Iraq** are disproportionately affected by economic

shocks, as they often rely on temporary work and have a higher dependence on debt than host communities (3RP, January 2024). Around 7 percent of Syrian refugees living in camps and 2 percent of IDPs in the country faced high levels of acute food insecurity from August to September 2023 (WFP, August 2023).

In **Algeria**, Sahrawi refugees residing in isolated camps near Tindouf faced severely limited livelihood opportunities. High food prices further strained limited incomes, with 94 percent of households continuing to rely on WFP assistance to meet their basic food needs (UNHCR, November 2023). Around 64 percent of Sahrawi refugees in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity in January 2024 (WFP, January 2024).

Data gaps remain for displaced populations. In **Syrian Arab Republic** and **Yemen**, data on acute food insecurity were not disaggregated, while data were not available for refugee populations in Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.


MAP 7.2 Number of forcibly displaced people by country/territory, 2024



► IDPs ► Refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: IOM, August 2024; IOM, December 2024; UNRWA, October 2024; UNHCR, October 2024; HNRP, January 2025.

FIG 7.9 Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises, 2013–2024



Sources: 2013–2023: UNHCR, IDMC, UNRWA; 2024: UNHCR Nowcasted estimates December 2024, IOM, UNRWA.

Acute malnutrition among displaced populations

Acute malnutrition among Sahrawi refugee children in **Algeria** remained high at 10.7 percent, according to 2022 SENS data (UNHCR, November 2023).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), where nearly the entire population was displaced, levels of acute malnutrition were Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) in the Rafah governorate, while in the North Gaza, Gaza, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates they were classified as Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) between November 2024 and April 2025 (IPC TWG, October 2024).

Data gaps persist for nutrition indicators among displaced populations in all other selected countries.

Focus | The impact of protracted conflict in the region

Many countries in the MENA region have experienced the impacts of conflict for years, with an intensification since the Arab spring of 2011, but 2024 was a particularly pivotal year of regional instability. The conflict in Palestine (Gaza Strip) intensified, insecurity in the Red Sea and DFA-controlled areas in Yemen increased, violence escalated in the West Bank and conflict reached Lebanon.

Disruption of agricultural systems

Conflict has devastated critical agricultural infrastructure, including farms, irrigation systems and storage facilities, reducing food production and increasing reliance on food imports. Restricted access to farmland and displacement of farming communities have further diminished local food production, exacerbating acute food insecurity (FAO, 2024).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), repeated periods of conflict since 2007 have devastated cropland and livestock production. Following the escalation of hostilities in October 2023, 75 percent of the Gaza Strip's cropland was damaged, including

over 67 percent of agricultural wells and 57 percent of greenhouses (FAO, January 2025). In **Palestine** (West Bank), continued insecurity and movement restrictions disrupted access to fields and inputs, hindering production (OCHA, December 2023).

In **Lebanon**, increased conflict between September and November 2024 severely disrupted agricultural production in key areas in the south, with nearly all crop producers and 90 percent of livestock farmers unable to access their fields, and almost all expecting significant crop losses (IPC, January 2025).

In **Syrian Arab Republic**, protracted conflict since 2013 led to decreased wheat harvest, with the average harvest from 2012 to 2024 at 1.8 million tonnes, 48 percent below the pre-crisis average of 4.1 million tonnes measured between 2002 and 2011 (FAO-GIEWS).

Economic instability

Conflict has led to economic decline, inflation and currency devaluation, making food unaffordable for many. In conflict zones, market systems often collapse, disrupting supply chains for essential

goods. Governments are unable to provide social protection and public services amid rising public debt. Livelihoods, especially for smallholder farmers and informal workers, have been disrupted, leaving families without income to purchase food. Unemployment and household debt levels continue to rise, compounding vulnerabilities (FAO, 2024).

Lebanon has experienced an extreme economic crisis since 2019. Intense conflict in late 2024 further strained the situation, causing a 5.7 percent contraction in economic activity (WB, December 2024). The physical damage and economic disruptions resulted in an estimated USD 8.5 billion in losses. The burning of large swathes of farmland, along with the abandonment of harvests and livestock, caused an additional USD 1.1 billion in losses over 12 months primarily in the southern and Beqaa regions (WB, November 2024).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), the collapse of formal economic structures resulted in informal markets characterized by extreme price fluctuations (OCHA, November 2024; WFP, December 2024). The food component of the Consumer Price Index

surged by 133 percent compared with pre-crisis levels (IPC, November 2024). In **Palestine** (West Bank), intensified insecurity in 2024 disrupted economic activity, resulting in the loss of 306 000 jobs (ESCWA & UNDP, October 2024).

Yemen's economic crisis, driven by ongoing conflict, resulted in a 54 percent contraction in real GDP per capita between 2015 and 2023 (WB, October 2024). The 2022 truce provided some relief, facilitating a gradual resumption of livelihood activities, market functionality and increased population mobility (IPC, October 2024). However, economic contraction resumed in 2023 and 2024 (WB, October 2024).

Thirteen years of protracted conflict have devastated the economic systems in **Syrian Arab Republic**. GDP contracted by 45 percent and the official exchange rate depreciated by 78 percent between 2010 and 2019 (WB, 2021). Between August 2021 and 2024, the national market average price for rice rose by 563 percent, while imported wheat flour increased by 406 percent (FAO, 2024).

TIMELINE | Since the first edition of the GRFC conflict has persisted, intensified and spread across many parts of the region, with profound impacts on the food security of its people.

2015
Escalation of hostilities in **Yemen**, driving widespread acute food insecurity with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between 2018 and 2022.

2016
Start of blockade of **Gaza Strip**. Three episodes of intense conflict severely damaged its economy and infrastructure.

2017
Yemen's food crisis worsens with 17 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above, the highest number worldwide

2021
The conflict in **Syrian Arab Republic** has been ongoing for ten years, with millions displaced internally and regionally.

2022
UN-brokered truce in **Yemen** significantly reduced conflict levels, though local fighting persisted along front lines as of December 2024.

2023
Escalating hostilities in the **Gaza Strip** created one of the most severe food crises in IPC and GRFC history.

2024
Yemen's nutrition crisis deteriorates with four districts in the GoY-controlled areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5), following years of conflict that has destroyed water, sanitation and health resources.

2024
Escalating conflict in **Lebanon** from September until a ceasefire in November 2024 displaced 900 000 people internally, caused widespread infrastructure damage and severely disrupted livelihoods.

2024
Regime change in **Syrian Arab Republic** in December 2024 provided hope for the return of displaced populations and conflict resolution; however, the situation remained volatile, with active conflict persisting in the northeast.

2025
The January 2025 ceasefire in **Gaza Strip** had provided hope for improved conditions, but renewed hostilities in March, coupled with a blockade of humanitarian, commercial supplies and electricity, signal a further deterioration.

Forced displacement

Millions of people have been displaced, internally and as refugees, straining host communities and reducing access to stable sources of food. Displaced populations often rely on inconsistent humanitarian assistance (FAO, 2024).

Conflict in **Syrian Arab Republic** since 2011 has displaced 7.4 million people internally and 4.7 million as refugees in neighbouring Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye (UNHCR, October 2024; UNHCR, 2024). Across the region, deteriorating economic conditions, rising food prices, and high inflation have further constrained access to food for displaced populations.

In **Lebanon**, most Syrian refugees were struggling to meet basic needs even before the escalation of conflict in September 2024. Widespread damage to shelters and economic contraction exacerbated their conditions (3RP, December 2024), displacing nearly 900 000 people internally, including already displaced refugee populations. The impact was particularly severe in the southern districts of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun and Sour, where 95 percent of households were displaced, severely disrupting livelihoods and agriculture (IPC, January 2025).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), conflict has displaced 1.9 million people, the vast majority of the population, at least once (OCHA, December 2024). Repeated displacement eroded individuals' ability to cope and access essential resources, such as food, water and medicine, further exacerbating vulnerabilities (IPC, November 2024).

In **Yemen**, despite the reduction of hostilities following the 2022 truce, climate shocks continued to drive new displacement, with 4.6 million people still internally displaced as of January 2025. Multiple rounds of displacement have eroded coping capacities and livelihood opportunities, while lack of documentation restricts access to essential services and legal protections (OCHA, January 2025).

Damage to infrastructure

Conflict has damaged roads, ports and supply chains, while blockades and restrictions hinder the delivery of essential supplies, disrupting overall market functionality (FAO, 2024).

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), prior to October 2023, damage from military operations since 2008 remained largely unrepaired, including critical physical infrastructure and productive assets such as agricultural equipment. The cumulative destruction resulted in inadequate access to clean water, prolonged electricity shortages, and insufficient sewage treatment (UNCTAD, September 2024). Even under an optimistic scenario, recovery is projected to take decades (UNCTAD, September 2024).

Conflict has caused extensive damage to **Yemen's** infrastructure. Between 2014 and 2022, at least one in four educational facilities were destroyed, damaged or repurposed for non-educational use (ICRC, October 2022). During the same period, nearly one-third of **Yemen's** paved roads were destroyed by conflict, restricting humanitarian access and trade (Coombs and Salah, January 2023). In DFA-controlled areas, increased conflict has damaged civilian infrastructure since October 2023 with air strikes damaging ports and airports, disrupting the flow of humanitarian assistance (UN Secretary-General, December 2024).

In **Syrian Arab Republic**, between 2013 and 2022, conflict has damaged physical infrastructure worth an estimated USD 5.8–7.8 billion (WB, December 2022). The protracted conflict has disrupted electricity, power supplies, and essential water and sanitation systems (OCHA, January 2024).

In **Lebanon**, conflict has damaged water infrastructure, while power shortages and strained financial resources have hindered access to clean and affordable water and disrupted wastewater treatment services.

Disrupted humanitarian access

Insecurity and violence have limited aid organizations' ability to reach those in need, disrupting critical food supplies, essential nutrition and vaccination programmes and healthcare.

Military operations continued to impede humanitarian operations in **Palestine** (Gaza Strip) throughout 2024, with at least 318 humanitarian workers killed (GHO, December 2024). In the northern governorates, humanitarian assistance was severely restricted in both early and late 2024, further reducing food availability (IPC, March 2024; IPC, November 2024).

Since June 2020, when data became available, **Syrian Arab Republic** has had 'very high' or 'extreme' access constraints on the ACAPS Humanitarian Access Scale. This indicates frequent interruptions to humanitarian activities or complete pauses (ACAPS, 2025) due to bombing of critical infrastructure, including airports, landmines and unexploded ordnance (OCHA, January 2024).

Health and sanitation crises

Poor sanitation, disease outbreaks and limited healthcare in conflict-affected areas have worsened malnutrition, particularly among children. Displaced populations often live in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions.

In **Palestine** (Gaza Strip), the situation remained especially dire through 2024, with mass displacement into makeshift camps reaching critical density of almost 40 000 people per square kilometre. Camps faced severe shortages of water, hygiene and sanitation resources, while destroyed health services heightened vulnerability to disease, particularly among children (IPC, January 2025).

The collapse of healthcare facilities and destruction of water infrastructure in **Yemen**, triggered one of the most severe cholera epidemics since 2016. In 2024, Yemen had the highest burden of cholera globally, as limited access to WASH infrastructure and treatment continued to hinder

recovery (WHO, December 2024).

In **Syrian Arab Republic**, protracted conflict has severely eroded healthcare services and disrupted humanitarian provision. The 2023 earthquakes in northern areas further damaged these already fragile systems, leading to a rise in communicable diseases, such as measles and cholera (Tarnas et al., November 2023).

In **Lebanon**, 47 percent of households were unable to reach health facilities during the 2024 hostilities, disproportionately affecting IDPs and refugees (IPC, January 2025).

The region's high vulnerability to the global climate crisis

Rising temperatures since the 1960s, combined with decreasing precipitation levels, have already driven conflict (Kelley et al., March 2015) and are expected to make the region a global hotspot for droughts (FAO, 2022). Prolonged conflict has weakened governmental capacity to address these climate shocks, exacerbating acute food insecurity.

The impacts are particularly severe in **Syrian Arab Republic**, which faces an ongoing water crisis and drought-like conditions, further damaging livelihoods and hindering recovery from 13 years of conflict (OCHA, November 2023).

Yemen is among the most vulnerable countries to climate change, with rising temperatures and increasingly frequent and intense flooding anticipated (UNDP, November 2023). However, 11 years of insecurity and limited governance capacity have hindered the development and implementation of climate adaptation policies (Barry et al., December 2024).

Lebanon is among the countries least prepared to address climate change as its economic crisis – now worsened by the 2024 conflict – has severely limited its adaptive capacity. Rising temperatures and declining water availability are projected to result in USD 250 million in agricultural losses due to reduced irrigation and insufficient rainfall for rain-fed crops (WB, March 2024).


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Despite overall improvements, escalated conflict disrupted economic systems and drove high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (DECEMBER 2024–MARCH 2025)

1.7M people or 30% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 0.2M people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

- Out of this total, **0.6M** were Syrian refugees (39% of the Syrian refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity).
- Out of this total, **0.09M** were Palestine refugees (40% of the Palestinian refugee population faced high levels of acute food insecurity).

This is an improvement since the 2023 peak, with 0.7M fewer people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). However, conflict escalation in late 2024 caused widespread displacement, disrupted livelihoods and exacerbated the ongoing economic crisis that has persisted since 2019. As displaced populations returned to formerly highly conflict-affected areas in late 2024, following the November ceasefire agreement, extensive infrastructure damage and economic instability hindered recovery (IPC, January 2025).



Source: Lebanon IPC TWG, January 2025.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity The sharp escalation of conflict between September and November 2024, coupled with 11 months of preceding hostilities, caused mass internal displacement, disrupted livelihoods and hindered agricultural activity (IPC, January, 2025).

Between October 2023 and November 2024, 900 000 people were displaced internally within Lebanon, while 560 000 were displaced into Syrian Arab Republic, 63 percent of whom were Syrian returnees (OCHA, January 2025). Despite the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, the long-term stability of the agreement remains uncertain (FEWS NET, December 2024).

An estimated 63 percent of farmers in highly affected areas abandoned agricultural activities, leaving fields untended (IPC, January 2025). The southern districts of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun and Sour were particularly impacted, with 90 percent of livestock farmers unable to access fields and nearly all households expecting significant crop losses for the 2024 season, severely affecting food access and livelihoods (IPC, January 2025). Nearly all shops in these districts became non-operational, creating major food access challenges (WFP, November 2024).

Economic shocks Conflict exacerbated Lebanon's protracted economic crisis, contracting economic activity by 5.7 percent and causing an estimated USD 8.5 billion in losses. Hostilities in key southern agricultural areas

resulted in an estimated USD 1.1 billion in losses driven by destruction to crops, livestock and assets (WB, November 2024). Economic contraction restricted employment opportunities in key sectors, while forced displacement further strained livelihood opportunities, resulting in the loss of 166 000 jobs (IPC, January 2025; WB, November 2024).

Despite a decrease in monthly inflation throughout the year, food prices rose 23 percent year-on-year between October 2023 and October 2024, with the Minimum Expenditure Basket increasing by 21 percent, further limiting household access to essential goods (WFP, November 2024). Reduced government revenues led to underfunding for public services and social services, leaving vulnerable households, including refugees and displaced people, without necessary relief (IPC, January 2025).

Weather extremes Unfavourable rainfall and high temperatures in May 2024 contributed to a 30 percent reduction in cereal yields compared with the latest four-year average (FAO-WFP, November 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

1.2M* refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024; UNRWA, September 2024.

0.1M IDPs

Source: IOM, December 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2022–2024/2025



Source: Lebanon IPC TWG.

A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Lebanon has been included since the GRFC 2023, following its first IPC analysis in September 2022. The Syrian refugee population in Lebanon has been included since GRFC 2018 with data from Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon analyses until 2023. The protracted economic crisis since October 2019 has been a key driver of the food crisis, marked by soaring inflation, which reached 221 percent in 2023 (IMF, 2024). The local currency lost 98 percent of its value, severely restricting import capacity in a country that relies on imports for 87 percent of its cereal requirements (IMF, June 2023; FAO, 2024). The Beirut Port blast in August 2020 further strained Lebanon's import capacity, compounding the economic shocks of COVID-19. Lebanon hosts the highest per capita refugee population in the world, with at least 1.5 million Syrians and 200 000 Palestine refugees, who face limited livelihood opportunities and high rates of household debt (3RP, December 2024). The country's food crisis peaked in January–April 2023, when 2.3 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 53 percent of Syrian refugees.

NUTRITION CONCERN

A GAM prevalence of below 5 percent, ranging from 0 to 3.6 percent, indicated acceptable levels of acute malnutrition (equivalent to IPC AMN Phase 1) among children aged 6–59 months in 2023 (MoPH et al., 2024). In the absence of 2024 data, contextual factors such as populations facing IPC Phase 4 levels of acute food insecurity and 'very high' ratings on the INFORM Severity and Risk indices were considered indicators of a likely deterioration in the nutrition situation in 2024.

Conflict-related population displacement in 2024 and the destruction of basic services, including water and sanitation infrastructure (OCHA-HNO, December 2024), coupled with severe economic instability since 2019, have affected access to nutritious foods (IPC, May 2024). Multiple indicators suggest that children have vulnerability to malnutrition and low resilience to shocks. A low proportion of children consumed a minimum acceptable diet (10.7 percent), with a third living in severe food poverty (consuming 0–2 food groups), highest among Palestinian refugee children. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were suboptimal (22.7 percent) and a high proportion of children were born with a low birth weight (20 percent) (MoPH et al, 2024).

Gaza Strip

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Severe food shortages and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure created a dire and more severe situation.


PEAK 2024 (MARCH-APRIL)

2.2M people or **100%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, around **0.9M** or **38%** were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

While the number and share of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) remained unchanged since the 2023 peak, the severity worsened, with the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) nearly doubling from 0.6 million.

1.1M or **50%** of the total population faced **Catastrophe** (IPC Phase 5) during this period. In North Gaza and Gaza governorates, 70% of the population were in this phase. While in March 2024, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was projected to be imminent, a new June analysis indicated that, following increased deliveries of commodities and scaled-up humanitarian response in northern governorates, the available evidence did not indicate Famine was currently occurring. A risk of Famine persisted for the entire year due to intense conflict, severe lack of humanitarian and commercial access and frequent repeated displacement.

Source: IPC Global Initiative, March 2024; FRC, June 2024.



Source: IPC Global Initiative, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (MAY-SEPTEMBER)


2.1M people or **100%** of the total population were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, around **1.1M** or **54%** are in IPC Phase 4.

Between mid-January and mid-March 2025, the ceasefire allowed a temporary alleviation of acute food insecurity in parts of the Gaza Strip. However, the blockade imposed in early March reversed the situation. From mid-March, the escalating conflict led to more mass displacement, further disrupted access to humanitarian assistance, markets, health, water and sanitation services, and caused additional damage to remaining essential infrastructure.

Almost **0.5M** or **22%** of the total population are projected in **Catastrophe** (IPC Phase 5) during this period.

In a scenario of protracted and large-scale military operation and continuation of the humanitarian and commercial blockade, supplies and services essential for people's survival are either depleted or expected to run out. Under this reasonable worst-case scenario, food insecurity, acute malnutrition and mortality would surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds.

Source: IPC, May 2025.



DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024-2025

Conflict/insecurity Intense and protracted conflict disrupted livelihoods and food systems, with the vast majority of Gazans displaced at least once (IPC, November 2024). Hostilities had damaged or destroyed 75 percent of cropland, 57 percent of greenhouses, 68 percent of wells, a water treatment plant, the main port and over 3 000 other agricultural infrastructures by 31 December 2024 (FAO, December 2024). The cultivation of olive orchards declined by 75 percent with over 1 million olive trees uprooted since October 2023 (IPC, November 2024).

Severe damage to local food production left markets and communities entirely reliant on food imports (IPC, November 2024), but restrictions prevented commercial and humanitarian trucks from entering in sufficient quantity to match demand. In the first half of December 2024, the average number of trucks entering each day dropped to 87, down from 200 in August and September 2024 and well below the pre-conflict average of 500 (WFP, December 2024).

The January 2025 ceasefire agreement had offered hope for improved conditions. Challenges to humanitarian access persisted due to extensive infrastructure damage (ACAPS, January 2025) and the ceasefire ended in mid-March. From mid-March, the escalating conflict displaced over 430 000 people (IPC, May 2025). Even under an optimistic

scenario of double-digit growth and substantial foreign aid, livelihood recovery is projected to take decades to return to pre-October 2023 levels (UNCTAD, January 2025).


Economic shocks Conflict halted nearly all economic activity across the Gaza Strip, with 66 percent of all buildings damaged (UNCTAD, September 2024; UNITAR, September 2024).

The collapse of formal economic structures led to extreme price volatility in informal markets (OCHA, November 2024; WFP, December 2024). Food prices soared, with the cost of basic commodities ten times higher than pre-conflict levels by December 2024, severely limiting household food access (WFP, December 2024). Food prices continued to rise daily in 2025 with wheat flour in Gaza and Khan Younis increasing by 3 000 percent between February and April 2025 (IPC, May 2025).

No functional markets existed in North Gaza and Rafah, while critical shortages were reported in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Gaza governorates as of December 2024 (WFP, December 2024).

Increased prices for agricultural inputs and fuel limited planting in late 2024, exacerbating livelihood losses and reducing domestic food availability in 2025 (IPC, November 2024).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023-2025



Source: IPC Global Initiative.

History of the food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Palestine (Gaza Strip) has been included in the last eight GRFC editions. Since 2008, repeated conflict has devastated the Gaza Strip's economy, driving high unemployment and household debt. The 17-year blockade and restrictions further eroded coping capacities, increasing reliance on aid (UNRWA, August 2023). No IPC analyses were conducted until the escalation of conflict in 2023. Data from analyses before 2023 are not comparable with IPC data.


Gaza Strip

NUTRITION CRISIS | Near collapse of basic services and highly constrained humanitarian access led to rising malnutrition.

PEAK (NOVEMBER 2024–APRIL 2025)


The entire Gaza Strip was classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with Rafah in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).

Prevalence in North Gaza was 30 percent (by MUAC) in children under 2 years old in February 2024, prompting a risk of Famine alert for Gaza City and North Gaza from March to July 2024. This was a significant deterioration from pre-October 2023, when prevalence was 0.8 percent (by weight-for-height).



Source: Nutrition Cluster, 2025; IPC Global Initiative, March, October 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (SEPTEMBER 2024–AUGUST 2025)




Source: IPC Global Initiative, October 2024.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Collapsed food systems and soaring prices caused severe food deprivation. Over 90 percent of children aged 6–23 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women ate two or fewer food groups daily. Limited baby milk formula led to reduced intake and substitution with animal milk, increasing infection and malnutrition risk (IPC, November 2024; GNC, February 2024).

Water and wastewater infrastructure collapsed due to bombardment. Gazans had less than 1 litre per person per day on average, significantly below the minimum

humanitarian standard of 15 litres per person per day (GNC, February 2024). Communicable disease rates were critical, worsening in winter, affecting about one-third of children (UNICEF, September 2024), amid a collapsed health system due to attacks on facilities and staff arrests (IPC, November 2024). Humanitarian and commercial inflow temporarily alleviated conditions in May but restrictions resumed in September in northern governorates of Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah. Malnutrition treatment availability was unpredictable with limited facilities (UN, September 2024).



West Bank

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Increased violence and deteriorating economic conditions drove increasing acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER)

0.7M people or 21% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

This is 0.1 million more people than during the 2023 peak as escalating violence, constrained economic opportunities and movement restrictions further limited household access to food. Continued violence and economic shocks are expected to continue driving acute food insecurity in 2025 (OCHA, December 2024).

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity Elevated insecurity continued in the West Bank characterized by frequent military raids and widespread arrests (ACLED, December 2024). From 7 October 2023, settler violence intensified, averaging four incidents per day. The increased intensity and frequency of violence, along with ongoing demolitions of infrastructure, displaced over 4 500 people internally between October 2023 and December 2024 (OCHA-HNO, December 2024).

The increase in violence prevented farmers from harvesting 4 000 hectares of farmland in 2024, with trees, crops and agricultural infrastructure damaged (OCHA-HNO, December 2024). The violence severely disrupted the 2024 olive harvest decreasing yields by 28 percent compared with 2021 (OCHA, October 2024; OCHA, November 2024).

Between October 2023 and May 2024, the number of checkpoints, road gates, earth walls and trenches increased by 23 percent across the West Bank, often blocking access to major roads, and limiting movement

between communities (OCHA, August 2024). Movement restrictions disproportionately affected Bedouin and herding communities, limiting access to grazing lands for livestock, and restricting livelihood opportunities (OCHA, October 2024).

Economic shocks Continued conflict disrupted economic activity across the West Bank with private sector production declining by 51 percent in the first three quarters of 2024 (MAS, December 2024). Economic decline tripled the unemployment rate since 7 October 2023, resulting in the loss of over 300 000 jobs (UNCTAD, September 2024). The mass cancellation of Palestinian worker permits for the Israeli labour market further restricted livelihood opportunities (OCHA-HNO, December 2024).

Rural communities face ongoing challenges, with farmland located between the Green Line and the Separation Barrier becoming inaccessible due to permit cancellations, resulting in significant income losses (OCHA, September 2024).

Gaza Strip and West Bank

PALESTINE DISPLACEMENT

2.5M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024; UNRWA, September 2024.

1.9M IDPs

Source: UNRWA, October 2024.

The figure for IDPs corresponds solely to populations in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA estimates that 70 per cent of IDPs in the Gaza Strip were Palestine refugees under its mandate. For this country brief, this share is also included in the 2.5 million refugees and asylum-seekers. For the estimated total number of forcibly displaced people in Palestine, which includes the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this share of internally displaced refugees under UNRWA's mandate is only counted once.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A persisting food crisis following 13 years of conflict and economic crisis.


PEAK 2024 (AUGUST–OCTOBER)

9.2M people or 39% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity based on WFP CARI methodology.

The situation remained critical, with high food prices and localized conflict sustaining high levels of acute food insecurity. However, the analysis is not comparable with the 2023 peak due to changes in data methodology. It was conducted before the escalation of conflict in late November 2024 and the subsequent regime change.

Source: HRP, 2025.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by categories of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: HNO/HRP.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Syrian Arab Republic has been included among the ten largest food crises in terms of numbers of people in all GRFC editions. The number facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 6.5 million people in 2018 and 6.6 million in 2019 (about 30 percent of the population) to 12.4 million (60 percent of the population) by November 2020 due to protracted and intensifying conflict leading to further displacement, high unemployment and increasing food prices, but also to a change in methodology for the Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment. The magnitude and prevalence remained persistently high thereafter. Despite the improvement in 2024, the situation remained extreme, attributable to escalating hostilities, deteriorating economic situation, adverse weather events, and a lack of recovery from the February 2023 earthquake.

Food secure and marginally food secure Moderately and severely acutely food insecure Total population

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks Food prices continued to rise in 2024, with the food component of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) by 21 percent higher year-on-year in September 2024. As a result, the minimum wage could only cover 16 percent of the MEB food component, leaving many households unable to meet basic nutritional needs (WFP, September 2024).

Renewed hostilities from late November to early December 2024 disrupted markets and humanitarian assistance, causing a dramatic surge in the prices of essential food items, severely limiting household access to food. In Aleppo and Idlib, bread prices increased by 900 percent (OCHA, December 2024). While prices stabilized by late December 2024, the availability of staple commodities in markets remained limited (OCHA, December 2024).

High input costs – with fertilizer prices tripling since 2023 – raised production expenses, limiting farmers’ access to inputs and negatively affecting agricultural output (FAO-GIEWS, November 2024).

The suspension of subsidized fuel in December 2024 raised costs for farmers and constrained planting for the 2025 wheat harvest (OCHA, January 2025).

Conflict/insecurity The conflict in Syrian Arab Republic entered its 13th year in 2024. It has devastated livelihoods, eroded economic stability, and left millions of people dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival.

While the transition to a new government has brought some stability, localized conflict persisted throughout the country as of January 2025. Between late November and December 2024, intensified hostilities displaced 1.1 million people. By early January 2025, 627 000 people remained newly displaced, alongside 2 million IDPs in over 1 500 camps and informal settlements across the northwest (OCHA, January 2025). As of January 2025, the situation remained volatile, with insecurity disrupting movement, damaging critical infrastructure and restricting humanitarian access (OCHA, January 2025).

Between September and November 2024, conflict in Lebanon displaced 557 000 people into the country, 63 percent of whom were returning Syrian refugees, facing heightened vulnerability due to renewed displacement (UNHCR, November 2024).

Weather extremes Poor temporal rainfall distribution and high temperatures in April and May 2024 led to a 16 percent decline in the 2024 wheat harvest since 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, November 2024). The total cereal harvest for 2024 is estimated at 3.7 million tonnes, 7 percent below the five-year average (FAO-GIEWS, November 2024).

DISPLACEMENT


0.6M refugees and asylum-seekers **7.4M** IDPs

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024; UNRWA, September 2024. UNHCR, October 2024.

NUTRITION CONCERN

Volatile conditions in 2024 may have further worsened limited healthcare access amid disease outbreaks and high levels of acute food insecurity.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024)



Source: HNO 2024, March 2024.

Lattakia governorate had elevated levels of acute malnutrition prevalence at 10 percent (combined WHZ and MUAC), equivalent to Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) levels. Rural Damascus, Idlib, Ar-Raqqa and Quneitra governorates recorded prevalence equivalent to Alert (IPC AMN Phase 2) (SMART, 2022).

Recurrent disease outbreaks, a drought and water crisis, low access to healthcare and food insecurity were identified as the main contributing factors (OCHA-HNO, March 2024). A low proportion of children aged 6–23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet (5 percent), indicated a ‘very high’ risk factor for acute malnutrition (SMART, 2022).

The 2024 influx of Syrian refugees returning from Lebanon and of Lebanese refugees further stretched resources in northeastern and northwestern governorates (UNICEF, December 2024). A lack of funding in 2024, left nearly 1 million without required sanitation improvements and half of all health facilities in the northwest non-functional (UN, December 2024).


ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Continued conflict and economic downturn drove high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER 2024–MARCH 2025)

16.7M people or 48% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This peak reflects aggregated IPC data for **Government of Yemen-controlled (GoY)** areas and Food Security Cluster (FSC) data for **De Facto Authorities-controlled (DFA)** areas. Data for GoY-controlled areas were chosen from the October 2024–March 2025 reporting period to align with FSC data, and is not directly comparable with the 2023 FEWS NET peak, which reported 56 percent of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

GoY-controlled areas

4.6M people or 45% of the GoY-controlled area population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, **1.1M** were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).



Source: IPC TWG Yemen, October 2024.

DFA-controlled areas

12.0M people or 49% of the DFA-controlled area population faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Source: FSC, November 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (OCTOBER 2024–MAY 2025)*

17.1M people or 49% of the total population (GoY- and DFA-controlled areas) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. In GoY-controlled areas, **1.1M** of them are projected in IPC Phase 4.

This marks a slight deterioration since the 2024 peak despite a reduction in hostilities, driven by the ongoing pause in humanitarian assistance in DFA-controlled areas, and increasing food prices nationwide. This is the same analysis as the 2024 peak for GoY areas.

* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

Source: IPC TWG Yemen, October 2024; FSC, November 2024.



DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks Yemen's economic crisis deepened in 2024, with fiscal revenues dropping 30 percent due to reduced oil and customs income. Food prices rose sharply, with the Minimum Food Basket cost reaching record highs, driven by further currency depreciation and rising import costs. Reduced income opportunities left many households unable to afford essential goods (IPC, October 2024). Tensions between GoY and DFA disrupted trade and financial flows, while reduced humanitarian aid left millions without sufficient rations to meet nutritional needs (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Conflict/insecurity The 2022 UN-brokered truce brought relative stability, facilitating a gradual resumption of livelihood activities, market functionality and

increased population mobility. However, localized fighting persisted in frontline districts in Ad Dali', Ta'iz, Lahj, Al Jawf, Shabwah, Abyan and Ma'rib (IPC, October 2024).

Weather extremes Torrential rains caused flooding from March 2024 that impacted 400 000 people, damaged 99 000 hectares of crops and led to loss of livestock (IPC, October 2024). Flooding in August 2024 further damaged crops, infrastructure and livelihoods (FAO-GIEWS, October 2024).


DISPLACEMENT

0.1M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

4.6M IDPs

Source: IOM, September 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2022, 2024–2025

The 2024 and 2025 peaks reflect aggregated IPC and FSC data.


Source: IPC TWG Yemen; FSC.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Yemen has been included as a food crisis with no fewer than 13 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in all GRFC editions. According to IPC analyses, populations faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the peak period each year between 2018 and 2022, primarily in DFA-controlled areas.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Flooding and the persistent cholera outbreak worsened an already severe nutrition situation.

PEAK 2024 (JULY–OCTOBER)

All GoY-controlled areas were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above) with four in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) for the first time. In DFA areas, health centre screening data indicated acute malnutrition prevalence above 10 percent in 11 governorates.



Source: IPC, August 2024; WHO, September 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024)

2.4M children aged 6–59 months

1.8M MAM

Source: HNO, 2024.

0.7M pregnant and breastfeeding women

0.5M SAM


CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Flood-affected water and sanitation infrastructure, poor hygiene practices, and a lack of safe drinking water and latrines led to high levels of disease, further amplified by conflict. By September, the cholera outbreak had spread to 20 of the 22 governorates (UNICEF, November 2024). In Al Hodeidah, *E. coli* contamination of water sources was the likely cause of a localized spike in acute malnutrition (IPC, August 2024).

The quantity and quality of diets remained inadequate, with only 15 percent of children aged 6–23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet. Only 10 percent

of infants under 6 months were exclusively breastfed (IPC, August 2024). Eighty percent of children under 5 years suffered from anaemia – well above the WHO threshold for a severe public health problem (40 percent) (UNICEF, August 2024).


Humanitarian funding reductions and a deteriorating humanitarian operating environment limited aid provision (IPC, August 2024; UNICEF, November 2024). The suspension of the blanket supplementary feeding programme and the general food assistance pause in the DFA-controlled North for most of 2024 removed key safety nets (IPC, August 2024; WFP, May 2024).



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | At least 60 percent of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria and Syrian refugees in Egypt and Jordan faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Refugees in Egypt

PEAK 2024 (JANUARY)

 **475 700** people or **60%** of refugees in Egypt faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, January 2024).

This is not comparable with the 2023 peak due to expanded analysis coverage.

High inflation and rising cost of living continued to drive acute food insecurity. While inflation decreased from its February 2024 peak of 37 percent, it remained elevated, averaging 26 percent through August and September 2024 and providing further economic strain on refugee households (IMF, 2024).

The arrival of a large number of refugees from the Sudan – about 570 000 by November 2024 – placed more pressure on the country's already strained social services (UNHCR, November 2024; UNHCR, July 2024). According to government estimates, 1.2 million Sudanese have fled to Egypt (including asylum-seekers and prospective asylum-seekers) since the conflict started. New arrivals from the Sudan face significant barriers to accessing assistance, as they must travel from border regions to Cairo for registration, incurring additional travel costs. Worsening economic constraints further compounded these difficulties, leaving many Sudanese refugees struggling to meet their basic needs and afford adequate accommodation (UNHCR, July 2024).

Source: WFP, January 2024.

Syrian refugees in Iraq

AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 2023 (NO 2024 DATA AVAILABLE)

 **18 800** people or **7%** of the registered Syrian refugees living in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity.

Since 2017, relative stability has improved conditions for Syrian refugees in Iraq. Most are primarily of Kurdish origin and reside in the Kurdish region where a high degree of acceptance within host communities facilitates their inclusion in public services and social protection schemes. However, reduced humanitarian funding and the prolonged impact of conflict have weakened the capacity and resilience of national institutions and may cause future vulnerability (3RP, January 2024).

Economic shocks disproportionately affect refugees who are more likely to rely on temporary work and have higher reliance on debt than host communities (3RP, January 2024).

Source: WFP, August 2023.

Countries in the region hosting Syrian refugees, December 2024



The analyses on this page only refer to specific refugee populations selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2025 and with data meeting GRFC technical requirements.

For more information, see page 152 and chapter 3 | Displacement.

Syrian refugees in Jordan

PEAK 2024 (JULY–SEPTEMBER)

 **516 800** people or **75%** of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, 2024).

This represents a deterioration since 2023 when 62 percent of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity, mainly linked to worsening economic conditions.

For the approximately 80 percent of Syrian refugees who reside in host communities, declining monthly incomes and rising costs led to the adoption of negative coping strategies, such as taking out loans, buying food on credit, and reduction in non-food expenditures. On average, Syrian refugees in these communities have accumulated debts equivalent to six times their monthly income to meet basic needs. Significant gender disparities persist, with only 7 percent of Syrian refugee women employed, compared with 55 percent of men (UNHCR, June 2024).

The other 20 percent of Syrian refugees reside in Za'atari and Azraq camps, where the poverty rate rose from 45 percent in 2021 to 67 percent in 2023. Households increasingly rely on negative coping strategies and debt to cover food expenses. Rising consumer prices (increasing by 2 percent between January and July 2024), combined with stagnating wages in Jordan, reduced household purchasing power, especially for Syrian refugees in camps, who face restricted income sources (IMF, 2024; UNHCR, June 2024).

Source: WFP, 2024.

History of the food crises among Syrian refugees

Syrian refugees have been included in seven out of nine editions of the GRFC. The 13-year conflict in Syrian Arab Republic has displaced millions of people, some multiple times. By the end of 2024, 4.8 million Syrian refugees were in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye (UNHCR, 2024). While the transition to a new interim government in December 2024 provided hope for an end to the displacement crisis, the situation remains fragile with no guarantee of voluntary returns with safety and dignity (UNHCR, December 2024). In most host countries in the region, various policy barriers severely limit refugees' livelihood opportunities, which, coupled with persistent economic shocks in the region, including high inflation, have constrained household incomes and limited their food access (3RP, December 2023).

Sahrawi refugees in Algeria

PEAK 2024 (JANUARY)

 **111 100** people or **64%** of Algeria's 174 000 Sahrawi refugees in camps faced high levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, 2024).

This number is not comparable with the 2023 peak due to an increase in analysis coverage.

Sahrawi refugees have resided in isolated camps near Tindouf since 1975, facing harsh climatic conditions, including high temperatures, frequent sandstorms, and periodic flooding. Livelihood opportunities are severely limited. Households allocate up to 75 percent of their limited income to food due to high prices (UNHCR, November 2023). Over 94 percent of households rely on WFP assistance to meet basic food needs. However, since November 2023, food rations have been reduced by 25–30 percent due to funding shortfalls (UNHCR, November 2023; WFP, October 2024).

Source: WFP, 2024.

NUTRITION CONCERN

The Sahrawi refugee population in **Algeria** is classified as a nutrition concern. From 2019 to 2022, acute malnutrition prevalence increased from 8 percent to 11 percent (WFP, December 2024), considered Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) by IPC thresholds. Only 1 in 3 children met minimum recommendations for dietary diversity (WFP, August 2022) and breastfeeding rates were suboptimal (UNHCR, 2024). High levels of anaemia in children (54.2 percent) and pregnant and breastfeeding women (53.5 percent) were a severe public health problem (WFP, October 2024). The Sphere Standard access to safe water of 20 litres per person per day was only met for one camp in 2022. Access to healthcare was considered insufficient, particularly in the Tindouf camps, although measles vaccination coverage was 100 percent (UNHCR, 2024).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Refugee populations in Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and residents and refugees in Libya were selected, but data were either unavailable or did not meet GRFC requirements.



Selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2025 but lack data meeting GRFC technical requirements.

Indicates refugee population (colour coded in the same way as countries).

Armenia (refugees)

An upper-middle-income country, Armenia has qualified for inclusion in the GRFC 2021, GRFC 2022, GRFC 2024 and GRFC 2025 because of assistance provided to refugees and host communities, but the available data on acute food insecurity did not meet GRFC technical requirements.

Between September 2023 and 2024, 115 000 people were registered in the country following an increase in military hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Over 100 000 of them arrived through the Lachin corridor in the first weeks following escalation, with the majority (76 percent) moving to the

capital Yerevan and the surrounding regions. The government has extended temporary protection rights until December 2025, enabling them to access basic services and employment (IFRC, November 2024).

An analysis in March 2024 showed that acute food insecurity tended to be worse in the poorer, northern regions of Armenia, and lower among the refugees (WFP, March 2024), primarily due to assistance from the government, international and local organizations.

Islamic Republic of Iran (refugees)

The Islamic Republic of Iran, a lower-middle-income country, has qualified for inclusion in each edition since the GRFC 2020 due to forced displacement and external assistance provided to refugees. In this edition it qualified for inclusion due to external assistance provided to refugees, but, as with the GRFC 2024, no data on acute food insecurity are available. For the GRFC 2020 to 2023, the data available did not meet technical requirements.

It is estimated that the Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the largest number of displaced people and migrants in the world, at around 4.5 million people, the majority of whom are Afghan followed by Iraqi (IOM, 2024). UNHCR estimates that, of the total, about 3.8 million were recognized as refugees or living in refugee-like situations in 2024 (UNHCR, 2024).

While some have the right to work and access services, many do not and face difficulty accessing employment, education and health services. Around 1.1 million Afghans returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2024 (OCHA, December 2024), marking a slight increase since 2023 when just under 1 million returned (OCHA, February 2024).

Return movements could further increase following the September 2024 announcement by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to deport up to 2 million undocumented Afghans from the country. The announcement sparked a temporary increase in inflow movements in the last quarter of 2024 (IOM, November 2024, UNHCR December 2024).

Many returnees require assistance upon return, with shelter and accommodation being the primary need (82 percent), followed by financial assistance (81 percent) and food (76 percent) (UNHCR, December 2024, November 2024).

Inflation eased throughout 2024 (Iran Statistical Office, December 2024). The rate of inflation on food also decreased but remained high, with retail prices of food up to 30 percent higher than 12 months earlier, despite an above-average wheat harvest (FAO, November 2024), thus reducing access to food by poorer households.

Despite continued government support, the La Niña event is expected to lead to drier-than-normal weather conditions between January and May 2025, which may reduce yields.

Libya

Libya, an upper-middle-income country, has been included in all editions of the GRFC but no data on acute food insecurity were available for the GRFC 2024 or for this edition.

Between January and November 2024, an estimated 173 000 Sudanese refugees crossed into the southeastern district of Al Kufra alone, amounting to about 400–500 arrivals per day (UNHCR, December 2024). While at least 125 000 health certificates have been issued by health authorities, which enables free movement and access to work and healthcare in the country, refugees still face a difficult situation with limited access to shelter, water and food (IMC, December 2024).

Populations in the northeast were still affected by the devastating Storm Daniel in 2023. According to the Rapid Damage Needs Assessment (RDNA), jointly conducted by the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union, published in January 2024,

physical damage and losses caused by the storm and the flood are estimated at USD 1.65 billion. Flooding occurred in one of Libya's poorest regions, accentuating vulnerability across multiple dimensions (WB, September 2024).

The cost of the national MEB showed a rising trend through 2024 limiting household food access. It rose from just over USD 163 in January to a peak of USD 201 in September but then decreased to USD 193 in November 2024 (WFP, November 2024). The cost of the MEB was highest in Al Kufra, where there are a high number of Sudanese arrivals. The rate of food inflation followed a similar pattern, but decreased from September to 3.5 percent in November, although still higher than the same period in 2023 (Bureau of Statistics and Census Libya, 2024). The general annual inflation rate was quite low at 2.3 percent (IMF, October 2024).